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INTRODUCTION
The United States government, through many different agencies, has spent decades
extensively monitoring constitutionally protected activities of its citizens. From the
communications of prominent activists1 to the mundane phone conversations of the politically
uninvolved,2 we are finding more and more that what we say and do in our everyday lives is no
longer part of the private sphere, but is increasingly absorbed into the amorphous, indefinitely
extensive, and nearly omnipresent mass of information at the disposal of government.

* Carlos Torres is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Michigan Law School. His work
history includes work at the Georgia Capital Defender’s Office, the University of Michigan Health System, Human Rights
Watch as a Program in Refugee and Asylum Law Fellow, and public service in civil rights enforcement. Azadeh
Shahshahani is President of the National Lawyers Guild and previously served as National Security/Immigrants’ Rights
Project Director with the ACLU of Georgia. She is a 2004 graduate of the University of Michigan Law School and also
has a Master’s in Modern Middle Eastern and North African Studies from Michigan. Tye Tavaras has a background in
International Studies, Arabic, and Public International Law. She is a graduate of Emory University, The American
University in Cairo, and Emory University School of Law. In addition to working at Emory University as a Study Abroad
Advisor, she has served as a contributing writer to Mic and Ramel Media. The authors would like to thank the following
students for their research support: Max T. Eichelberger, Rachel Reed, and Katie Rookard. The authors would also like to
thank Elisa Wong for her help with initial research for the Article.
1
See Allison Jones, The 2008 FBI Guidelines: Contradiction of Original Purpose, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
137, 138 (2009).
2

See Photo Gallery: NSA Documentation of Spying in Germany, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 29, 2013),
http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/photo-gallery-nsa-documentation-of-spying-in-germany-fotostrecke-99672-2.html.
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This Article begins with a general introduction to the surveillance currently underway in
our country, with a focus from just after the 9/11 tragedy to the present day. This will be followed
with a brief history of surveillance and race, from racial profiling to the Counterintelligence
Program (“COINTELPRO”), the first major break in understanding the extent and nature of the
surveillance state. By examining the mapping of communities of color in Georgia as a
representative illustration of the broader system of surveillance, the Article delves into more
extensive questions of international and constitutional law.
I. PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE
In an October 2011 letter to Attorney General Eric Holder, the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) urged the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” and the “Bureau”) to curtail
the “overbroad investigative authorit[y] the FBI has claimed” in its investigation of American
citizens based on racial, ethnic, religious, and political profiles.3 The letter summarizes how the
FBI used its authority to spy on political advocacy organizations,4 gained expanded authority to
operate in a new context under the pretext of threat assessment,5 significantly expanded the broadscale usage of telephonic and e-mail surveillance,6 and garnered a doubt-inducing 4.02% rate for
conversion of assessments to preliminary or full investigations.7 Nearly as egregious as the
surveillance itself is the authority of the FBI to retain a plethora of information indefinitely—
information that has not risen to the “reasonable indication” standard necessary to open a full
investigation.8 Not uncommonly, the information collected, reviewed, and transmitted within the
agency often has nothing to do with criminality, but rather the intimate details of people’s lives.9

3
Letter from ACLU to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, 1 (Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Holder Letter],
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_letter_to_ag_re_rm_102011_0.pdf.
4

Id. at 2.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

See id. (noting that of 82,325 assessments, only 3,315 resulted in full or preliminary investigations) (citing
Charlie Savage, FBI Focusing on Security Over Ordinary Crime, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/08/24/us/24fbi.html). This statistic is not a conviction rate, and counts only incidents where there was sufficient
evidence to surpass the subjective standard involved in opening an assessment. A full investigation must be based on “an
articulable factual basis of a ‘reasonable indication’ that a federal criminal violation or threat to the national security ‘has
or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur . . . .’” OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVESTIGATIONS OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC ADVOCACY GROUPS 10 (2010)
(alteration in original), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s1009r.pdf. The FBI notes that the “‘reasonable
indication’ standard is ‘substantially lower than probable cause.’” Id.
8

Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3 (“A 2009 FBI Counterterrorism Division ‘Baseline Collection Plan’
obtained by the ACLU through FOIA reveals the broad scope of information the FBI gathers during Assessments and
retains in its systems: identifying information (date of birth, social security number, driver’s license and passport number,
etc.), telephone and e-mail addresses, current and previous addresses, current employer and job title, recent travel history,
whether the person lives with other adults, possesses special licenses or permits or has received specialized training, and
whether the person has purchased firearms or explosives.”).
9

Mollie Reilly, NSA Workers Might Be Sharing Your Nude Photos, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/17/nsa-nude-photos_n_5597472.html.
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Such information has been collected on an ongoing, daily basis.10
These investigations do not stop at the individual level. As a predicate to finding the
targets for individual investigations, the FBI also preliminarily and without a convincingly
articulable standard engages in geo-mapping of ethnic communities when doing so will
“‘reasonably aid in the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities’ and assist in ‘intelligence
analysis.’”11 By tracking the movements of persons within ethnic areas and the locations of
“ethnically-oriented businesses and other facilities,”12 the FBI, as instructed by its 2008 internal
Domestic Investigation and Operations Guide (“DIOG”), catalogues “specific and relevant ethnic
behavior”13 in particular locations. This data collection extends to “‘behavioral and cultural
information about ethnic or racial communities’ that may be exploited by criminals or terrorists
‘who hide within those communities.’”14 This program is known as “Domain Management.”15 It
relies on broad-brush, stereotypical associations between perceived criminality and affiliation
with ethnic, national, religious, or political groups to justify surveilling and curtailing the civil
liberties of people solely on the basis of belonging to these groups.16
This racial, ethnic, religious, and political profiling is an affront not to only the collective
consciousness, but the FBI’s own internal directives. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Guidance
Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies17 prohibits race from being
used “to any degree” in law enforcement action or decision-making without a specific indication
of its appropriateness (i.e., a specific description of a particular perpetrator, witness, or other
actor).18 However, in the case of national security and border integrity investigations, this
restriction is very neatly loop-holed out of existence.19 These exceptions, barely facially neutral,
10
See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus.
Network Servs., Inc., no. BR 13-80, 2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215Order-to-Verizon.pdf.
11
Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3; see FBI, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE 32
(2008) [hereinafter DIOG], available at http://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operatio
ns%20Guide%20%28DIOG%29/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-2008-version.
12
ACLU, UNLEASHED AND UNACCOUNTABLE: THE FBI’S UNCHECKED ABUSE OF AUTHORITY 14 (2013),
available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/unleashed-and-unaccountable-fbi-report.pdf (citing DIOG,
supra note 11, at 32).
13

Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3 (quoting DIOG at 33) (internal quotation marks omitted).

14

ACLU, supra note 12 (quoting DIOG, supra note 11, at 34).

15

See id. at 14.

16

Id. at 15-17 (noting various ethnicities and nationalities, such as Hispanic, African-American, Chinese,
Russian, and their supposed criminal associations based on crude stereotypes used as predicates to unwarranted
surveillance of constitutionally protected activities).
17

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf.
18

Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3. The perversity of racial indications of criminality leads not only to
surveillance and targeting of particular individuals based on their guilt by association with others of their own racial or
ethnic group—which leads to a particularly wide-range of curtailment of constitutionally protected, everyday activities—
but also to myopia regarding who it is that can commit particular crimes, demonstrated by the elimination from law
enforcement and popular consciousness of the non-brown domestic terroristic threats represented by men like Ted
Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh, or the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord.
19

Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3; ACLU, supra note 12, at 14.
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lead to the targeting of Latino populations (given that our most active border is to the south) and
Middle Eastern populations (given the colloquial association between terrorism and persons of
Middle Eastern origin). Most unfortunately, the historical lack of religious profiling restrictions
has led to the further victimization of ethnic and immigrant populations, given the extensive
intersection of immigration status and minority religious status (i.e., Islam).20 Middle Eastern
Muslim immigrants, for example, already have three strikes against them in the surveillance
regime—and as such, their information and personal liberty are likely far from secure.
Often the most mundane of activities are reported under these constitutionally dubious
circumstances.21 Examples of activities reported by ordinary citizens include Middle Eastern
males purchasing large pallets of water, a professor taking photos of buildings for his art class, a
Middle Eastern physician neighbor being “unfriendly,” or protestors engaged in a scheduled
action sending an email regarding their concerns about the potential for police use of abusive
force.22 When the government effectively deputizes its citizens (using untrained persons in pursuit
of law enforcement priorities) to become reporting parties,23 and the law enforcement community
engages in blatant profiling without reasonable suspicion, it is inevitable that a large number of
innocent persons, groups, and activities will become the subject of unwarranted suspicion and
surveillance. Such surveillance not only chills one’s speech and perceived liberty, but may
actually change the content of one’s identity.24 Indiscriminate, mass surveillance activities may in
fact be causing the United States to miss clues about terrorist activity that might be discovered
with more limited, focused monitoring.25
II. WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT: SURVEILLANCE IN LEGAL HISTORY
AND ITS CURRENT LEGAL STATUS
The effectiveness of public surveillance lies in the ability of the state to keep its activities
secret. Secrecy, however, is not innate to the state, but is itself a legal construction with a

20
See generally PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: NO SIGNS OF GROWTH IN ALIENATION OR
SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM, (2011), available at http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim%20American%
20Report%2010-02-12%20fix.pdf. Sixty-three percent of American Muslims are immigrants. Id. at 8. Seventy percent of
American Muslims identify as non-white, as compared to thirty-two percent of the U.S. population as a whole in 2011. See
id. at 119.
21

Race, color, religion and national origin are all constitutionally protected classes under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2012)), and
citizenship status is protected for employment purposes under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
22
Julia Harumi Mass and Michael German, The Government is Spying on You: ACLU Releases New
Evidence of Overly Broad Surveillance of Everyday Activities, ACLU (Sept. 19, 2013, 10:15AM), http://www.aclu.org/
blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/government-spying-you-aclu-releases-new-evidence.
23
If You See Something, Say SomethingTM, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/if-you-seesomething-say-something (last visited June 29, 2015).
24

Frank Rudy Cooper, Surveillance and Identity Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by Martin Luther
King, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 536-38 (2008).
25
Ellen Nakashima, Snowden: Mass Surveillance is Backfiring on U.S. Efforts to Combat Terrorism,
WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/snowden-mass-surveillance-isbackfiring-on-us-in-effort-to-combat-terrorism/2014/03/10/61573dfa-a877-11e3-8d62-419db477a0e6_story.html.
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tumultuous, and unwarrantedly successful, history in American law. Moreover, the decisions
about what to keep secret—far from being matters of democratic debate—have been left to the
agencies producing the information and standing to lose the most if it is revealed. The lack of
judicial review and oversight and the fragmentation of the intelligence community, combined
with a culture of rampant secrecy, have created a nebulous, constitutionally dubious status quo.26
The privilege of the state to keep particular matters secret extends far back into our
monarchical roots. In 2007, in In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit reminded us that a state secrets
privilege has long been recognized27—coded phrasing that implies the privilege is a matter of
English common law.28 Various authors have located this privilege in traditions shielding the
internal machinations of royal courts from the plebian view, and to kings refusing to allow certain
debates to take place in Parliament.29 The state secret privilege was not explicitly adopted in the
United States until 1953, in United States v. Reynolds,30 when government lawyers brought it to
bear with great force, refusing to comply with judges’ orders to produce materials for
examination, even ex parte, in camera, citing the danger to national security that such information
would cause.31 The Supreme Court, somewhat reluctantly, decided in favor of the government32
and conducted, in that single case, the last serious examination of state privilege in the American
legal system.33
Importantly, members of the family that raised the initial suit would later come to
discover that the information, allegedly so detrimental to national security and so heavily relied
upon by the government, was not so sensitive after all.34 Mr. Reynolds, upon whose death the
above suit was based, had died in a mysterious plane crash.35 After the documents were
declassified, it turned out that the B-29 in which he was flying was simply an accident-prone
airplane, and that the engine had flamed out mid-flight.36 There were, in other words, no state
secrets to protect—only liability to avoid. The shaky ground upon which state secrecy stands in
the United States has very well predicted the quality of the dubiously “high-value” information
that it has shielded for over sixty years.
The McCarthyism of the 1940s and 1950s quickly seized on this newfound power, and
26
See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things no. BR 14-01, at 6
(FISA Ct., Feb. 5, 2014).
27

In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

28

26 KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE EVID. § 5663 (2015) [hereinafter Privileges].
29

Id.

30

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1953).

31

Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 989-90, 997 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see Barry
Siegel, A Daughter Discovers What Really Happened, L.A. TIMES, (Apr. 19, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/
2004/apr/19/nation/na-b29parttwo19.
32

Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7, 11-12.

33

See generally Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007).
34

Privileges, supra note 28.

35

Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2.

36

Privileges, supra note 28.
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used it to its extremes.37 Freed from the responsibility to share its actions publicly, the FBI began
to rampantly abuse its strategic capacities.38 The most well-studied aspect of these activities is the
FBI’s COINTELPRO, or Counter Intelligence Program.39 Exposed by a break-in to an FBI field
office in Pennsylvania,40 COINTELPRO was the heart of the Bureau’s “duty to do whatever [wa]s
necessary to combat perceived threats to the existing social and political order.”41 The FBI
engaged in surveillance and infiltration of groups advocating for social change;42 disseminated
false information about various groups to discredit and sow animosity amongst them through
regular media and planted agents;43 created and released documents purporting to come from
various targeted groups that painted them and their ends in a negative light;44 fostered discord
between various previously coordinating groups or within groups;45 used false arrest and
testimony to displace and disorganize leadership and deplete group resources through legal
battles;46 and was complicit in the organization of the assault and murder of prominent group

37

Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of
COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1078 (2002).
38

Id. at 1079.

39

Id. at 1060.

40

Mark Mazzetti, Burglars Who Took On F.B.I. Abandon Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/us/burglars-who-took-on-fbi-abandon-shadows.html.
41

Saito, supra note 37, at 1078-79; SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV’T OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT

TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SUPPLEMENTAL DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS
OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755,

book III, at 3 (2d Sess. 1976) [hereinafter SENATE SELECT COMM.].

Professor Saito provides an excellent and thorough background of oppression by and shadowy activities of
government agents intent on disturbing movements for change. A fuller history may be obtained in that article, which
provided invaluable background, and from which the authors drew heavily with respect to orientation and historical
sources for this Article.
42
The FBI intended to induce a state of paranoia and self-doubt, neatly summarized in J. Edgar Hoover’s
famous desire that he wanted his targets believe there was “‘an FBI agent behind every mailbox.’” Saito, supra note 37, at
1081-82.
43

Id. at 1082.

44

Id. Illustratively, the FBI commissioned a coloring book on behalf of the Black Panther Party that
“promot[ed] racism and violence” and “mailed copies to companies which had been contributing food to the Panthers’
Breakfast for Children program to get them to withdraw their support.” Id.
45
SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 41, at 40. The report discussed COINTELPRO’s strategies for
creating tension between groups:

Approximately 28% of the Bureau’s COINTELPRO efforts were designed to weaken groups by
setting members against each other, or to separate groups which might otherwise be allies, and
convert them into mutual enemies. The techniques used included anonymous mailings (reprints,
Bureau-authored articles and letters) to group members criticizing a leader or an allied group; using
informants to raise controversial issues; forming a “notional”—a Bureau-run splinter group—to
draw away membership from the target organization; encouraging hostility up to and including gang
warfare, between rival groups; and the “snitch jacket” [(attribution of being a police informant)].
Id. (footnote omitted).
46

Saito, supra note 37, at 1084-85. One of the best examples includes:
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leaders, regular members, and leaders’ families—including children as young as one year old.47
Contemporary commentators have noted that “the Bureau set out to destroy black leaders simply
because they were black leaders,” and at least one historian, David Garrow, has noted the
“strongly conservative” bent of the FBI, its employees’ right-wing inclinations, and thus the
influence that their political proclivities had on the Bureau’s political and operational stance.48
The secrecy under which the FBI was able to operate fostered a concept of invincibility at the
same time that, without a check on its exercise of power, encouraged abuses that would never
have been considered, if the watchful eye of the public and press had been allowed to remain on
them.49
Since that time, many of the more egregious abuses have either subsided or not yet come
to light.50 However, the American intelligence regime continues to suffer from a lack of
definitional, operational, and oversight coherency.51 The Supreme Court has yet to fully define the
Los Angeles [Black Panther Party (“BPP”)] leader Geronio ji Jaga (Pratt), who was the subject of
constant surveillance and numerous failed attempts to convict him of various crimes. Finally, in
1972, the government succeeded in convicting him of the 1968 “tennis court” murder of a woman in
Santa Monica on the basis of the perjured testimony of an FBI informant, and despite the fact that
the FBI, thanks to its surveillance, knew that Pratt had been 350 miles away at a BPP meeting in
Oakland at the time of the murder.
Id. at 1086.
47

Id. at 1087-88.

[T]he FBI provided direct support to the self-proclaimed “Guardians of the Oglala Nation” or
“GOONS” on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota who have been implicated in the
“unsolved” deaths of at least seventy individuals associated with [the American Indian Movement
(“AIM”)] between 1972 and 1976. Particularly chilling is the fate of the family of John Trudell,
AIM’s last national chairman:
In February 1979, Trudell led a march in Washington, D.C. to draw attention to the difficulties
the Indians were having. Although he had received a warning against speaking out, he
delivered an address from the steps of the FBI building on the subject of the agency’s
harassment of Indians . . . Less than 12 hours later, Trudell’s wife, Tina, his three children
[ages five, three and one], and his wife’s mother were burned alive in the family home in
Duck Valley, Nevada—the apparent work of an arsonist.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE FBI’S
SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT, 361 (2d ed. 2002)
(quoting another source)).
48
Paul Le Blanc, Revolutionary Road, Partial Victory: The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom,
65 MONTHLY REV. (Sept. 2013), http://monthlyreview.org/2013/09/01/revolutionary-road-partial-victory/.
49

See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, STANFORD UNIV., THE STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT: A
SIMULATION STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IMPRISONMENT CONDUCTED AUGUST 1971 AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
available at http://web.stanford.edu/dept/spec_coll/uarch/exhibits/Narration.pdf (illustrating the meditative effects of
watchful authority—and the extremes to which unsupervised people in positions of power can go). It is of particular note
that overnight, when the persons playing the role of “guard” were under the impression they were not being watched, the
abuses observed escalated immensely in both type and severity. See Ronald Hilton, US Soldiers’ Bad Behavior and
Stanford Prison Experiment, WORLD ASS’N INT’L STUD., http://wais.stanford.edu/War/war_05152004.htm (last visited
June 29, 2015).
50

See Saito, supra note 37, at 1102-04.

51

See generally Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 588-604 (2010).
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Constitution’s prohibitions on surveillance.52 Although confronted with the notion in at least two
major cases,53 the Court has not determined whether electronic surveillance (now the vast
majority of surveillance) “involving the national security” or “with respect to the activities of
foreign powers, within or without this country,” is entitled to constitutional review.54 Although
the latter failure of distinction seems innocent enough, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(“FISA”) of 1978 defines an “agent of a foreign power”—who is not, as of yet, constitutionally
protected—to be anyone who “acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in
clandestine activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States . . . .”55
Again, this seems innocuous enough. But in practice, agents of foreign powers are defined to
include both official representatives of a nation as well as any foreign terrorist organization, a
U.S. citizen or permanent resident who has committed certain crimes, or (per the National
Security Law Unit, the FBI’s non-criminal general counsel) any person not a citizen or permanent
resident who has a connection with a foreign power.56
Remarkably, the U.S. government is also allowed to deny that it is denying access to
information. The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) is the primary tool by which citizens and
public organizations gain access to government information that would otherwise be kept from
the public eye.57 The government is required to supply records responsive to citizen requests, with
a certain number of exceptions. When invoking an exception, the government is nominally
supposed to supply a description of the information withheld. However, even information
regarding the withholding of documents may now be withheld.58 This leeway, magnified by the
ability of the government to keep “national security” information a secret from nearly all parties
(including persons under investigation), gives almost complete carte blanche to the FBI—and any
other agency—to electronically surveil most people anywhere, at any time, with near
unaccountability.
Human intelligence—intelligence gathered by people who hear and see things
themselves—provides the other primary inroad for surveilling agencies, and has already been
exempted from First and Fourth Amendment protection.59 Since the days of Jimmy Hoffa, the

52

See id. at 589-90.

53

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,

299 (1972).
54

Rascoff, supra note 51, at 589-90.

55

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(B) (2013).

56

Michael P. Robotti, Grasping the Pendulum: Coordination Between Law Enforcement and Intelligence
Officers Within the Department of Justice in a Post-“Wall” Era, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 751, 767 & n.125, 780
(2009).
57

See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(A) (2013).

58

ACLU of New Jersey v. FBI, 733 F.3d 526, 533-34 (3d Cir. 2013). In ACLU v. FBI, the Third Circuit
denied a FOIA request for the release of FBI studies regarding the racial and ethnic characteristics of an area based on the
claim that the release of such information “could ‘reasonably be expected to interfere with [law] enforcement
proceedings,’” despite the prohibition on the use of race or ethnicity as a “‘dominant or primary factor’” in its
investigations. Id. at 531-32. The court rejected as “implausible” that “only disclosure of a ‘dominant or primary factor’
could impede an FBI investigation,’” id. at 532, potentially opening a Pandora’s box of excuses for failing to comply with
FOIA requests.
59

Rascoff, supra note 51, at 591.
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Supreme Court has found that, if you engage in speech that the government finds incriminating,
you have forfeited your right to privacy (albeit circularly) because the government may be
listening in.60 The potential criminality of acts discussed preemptively forfeits constitutional
protection of their discussion.
Oversight of government surveillance, already largely abdicated by the courts, is
weakened further by the myriad of agencies that participate in the gathering of intelligence. The
National Security Agency, the National Security Branch of the FBI, the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis with the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence are among the seventeen different agencies and offices that make up the United States
Intelligence Community.61 Although they meet to coordinate activities and information, each
agency operates independently, and brings its own expertise and motives to the table. A number
of these agencies are devoted to non-domestic work, which further complicates matters.62 Even
sub-federal authorities, like the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), now play a
domestic intelligence role.63
Beyond this, the bodies responsible for oversight of these agencies have fractured
jurisdictions that fail to exercise effective power over most aspects of public surveillance and
cannot provide a coherent picture of the scope of American domestic intelligence programs. No
particular body is charged with oversight of intelligence as a whole. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”) only has an ex ante role in the determination of the sufficiency
of an application for intelligence-gathering on a particular individual, group, or situation, and has
no competency for follow-up with the investigation that results from its decision.64 On the other
end of the continuum of investigation, civil suits are also difficult to bring: most people who have
been surveilled have no idea that surveillance is happening; it is difficult to prove an injury to
obtain standing; and the state secrets doctrine hamstrings any lawsuit before it can substantively
begin.65 Even in Congress, where there is supposed to be active oversight in place, committees are
weak; limited terms and purviews prevent the development of expertise in the field; investigations
generally only occur where there has been a public issue raised already; oversight committees
generally lack budgeting authority, which effectively declaws any enforcement strategy; and the
committees are miniscule compared to, yet just as fractured as, the agencies they purport to
oversee.66 Although pressure against these activities, a push for stronger regulations, and reduced

60

Id. n.50 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293

(1966)).
61

Id. at 593, 598 & n.84 (citing Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence:
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1662 (2006)); Our Strength Lies in
Who We Are, INTELLIGENCE.GOV, http://www.intelligence.gov/mission/member-agencies.html (last visited June 29, 2015)
(listing the seventeen U.S. agencies and offices that comprise the Intelligence Community).
62

See Rascoff, supra note 51, at 593.

63

Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Informant: NYPD Paid Me to “Bait” Muslims, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/Informant-NYPD-paid-me-to-bait-Muslims.
64

Rascoff, supra note 51, at 594-95. The FISA Court, in 2007, denied only three of the more than 2,300
warrant applications they were presented with which, although high, is “comparable to federal approval rates for search
warrants more generally.” Id. at 595 n.70.
65

Rascoff, supra note 51, at 596.

66

Id. at 596-98.
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informational accessibility is starting to build from within the government,67 the monitoring
bodies themselves are not always immune from the very surveillance they are supposed to be
regulating. This was recently evidenced by the highly publicized findings of the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) Office of the Inspector General’s report, completed on July 18,
2014, which found that CIA employees improperly accessed or caused access to Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence files and email.68
Intelligence and surveillance practices that the United States Intelligence Community
engages in are kept secret based on a dubious legal footing. This secrecy is compounded by the
organization of intelligence services in the United States, which, as explained above, is fractured
among seventeen different agencies and offices, with no central coordination or responsible
body.69 Add to this the exceptions to public oversight; a rubberstamp warrant court with no
follow-through authority; similarly confused and somewhat perpetually amateur toothless
Congressional oversight; and a public unaware of and legally unable to redress the violations of
its rights; and the result is an intelligence apparatus so fragmented and disorganized that it is
nearly impossible to monitor or control. Without a tight rein, it is historically apparent that
government intelligence agencies give in to some of their basest political and strategic desires,
and engage in dubiously legal, and outright illegal, activity.
III. MODERN SURVEILLANCE: SURVEILLANCE SINCE 9/11
However disorganized it may be, the American surveillance regime is very effective at
certain components of its job, regardless of their legality. The FBI and other agencies regularly
map everyday activities, targeting ethnic communities and engaging in blatant, if sometimes
seemingly innocent, racial profiling. Such programs invade the privacy of millions of Americans
under no justifiable pretense. An examination of what the government looks for, and how it
approaches the information it is seeking, can explain—though not excuse—the type of
information they are currently gathering.
The NYPD has been one of the more active domestic intelligence gathering services for
which we have extensive information. In his complaint against the NYPD, Hamid Raza quotes the
NYPD Radicalization Report’s admonition to monitor “[e]nclaves of ethnic populations that are
largely Muslim [that] often serve as ‘ideological sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought.”70
Warning of the dangers posed by middle-class families, college students, unemployed persons,
first, second, and third generation immigrants, alongside persons suspected of criminal conduct,
the Radicalization Report notes that the NYPD watches “radicalization incubators”—mosques,
“cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, . . . student associations, nongovernmental organizations,

67

See generally PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-1212_rg_final_report.pdf.
68

Summary of Report, CIA Office of Inspector General (July 31, 2014), available at http://images.
politico.com/global/2014/07/31/cia-senateigrdisumm.pdf.
69
See Rascoff, supra note 51, at 593, 598 & n.84 (citing Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of
Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1662 (2006)).
70

Complaint at 5, Raza v. City of New York, 998 F. Supp. 2d 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 3448) (first
alteration in original).
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hookah bars, butcher shops, and book stores.”71 Most egregiously, it identifies as “radicalization
indicators” the wearing of traditional Islamic clothing, beard growth, alcohol abstention, and
“becoming involved in social activism and community issues,”—all of which are First
Amendment-protected activities, and none of which inherently indicate criminality or terroristic
activity.72 Put another way, even if a person engaging in these activities was plotting a terrorist
action, these activities themselves would not substantiate a conclusion, one way or another. The
complaint also reveals that the NYPD engaged in mapping “ancestries of interest,” including
twenty-eight different nationalities and regions in addition to “American Black Muslims.”73
The FBI engages in similarly broad mapping of ethnic communities in Georgia. The
ACLU of Georgia obtained FBI documents that revealed the mapping of various ethnic
populations in Atlanta and the surrounding region, as well as the mundanity of the activities in
which they are engaged that apparently warrant suspicion.74 The FBI was monitoring the “Black
Separatist Threat” by noting rallies opposing the police killings of African Americans in Atlanta;
noting dated eight-year-old information that a prominent Nation of Islam official had operated in
Atlanta, and that “[i]n December 2001, . . . there [was] a strong alliance between the Crips and
NBPP [the New Black Panther Party] in Atlanta”; and outlining the population percentages of
African Americans through time and their projected growth in the future.75 Another document
appears to track the activities and nationalities of students and others in technological businesses,
noting the types of immigrants in Atlanta, recent census data, and various technical and scientific
conferences in the area, concluding with a list of U.S. military installations in the Atlanta area.76
Other documents reveal assessments of the numbers of foreign-born persons in Atlanta;77
“moderate confidence” information about the existence of Hizballah in Atlanta, which
presumably relies partly on demographic and census information for support;78 and an extensive
look at the presence of persons of a variety of Latino nationalities, justified by the presence of
some persons of those nationalities in the gang Mara Salvatrucha (“MS-13”)—also noting the use
of deportation as an alternative means of threat elimination when information is insufficient to
71

Id. at 5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

72

Id. at 6.

73

Id. The complaint listed the following countries and regions: “Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Chechnya, Egypt, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Yugoslavia,”
and noted that “[a]ll but three of these countries or regions have majority Muslim populations. One of those remaining
three countries—India—is home to eleven percent of the world’s Muslim population.” Id.
74

Letter from David M. Hardy, Section Chief, Record and Information Dissemination Section, Records
Management Division, FBI, to Azadeh Shahshahani (Dec. 22, 2010) (on file with author). Documents sent with this letter
in response to Shahshahani’s FOIA request are hereinafter referred to as “2010 FOIA.”
75

2010 FOIA, Document ACLURM011454 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at https://www.aclu.org/
files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011454.pdf.
76
2010 FOIA, Document ACLURM011477 (Oct. 23, 2009) (noting that FBI Atlanta hosts a “monthly
Counterintelligence Working Group (CIWG) and a quarterly Region 5 CIWG in which all USIC partners participate.”),
available at aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011477.pdf.
77
2010 FOIA, Document ACLURM011418 (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011418.pdf.
78

2010 FOIA, Document ACLURM011403 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011403.pdf.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

INDISCRIMINATE POWER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

294

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

7/24/15 1:34 PM

[Vol. 18.4

warrant criminal prosecution.79 These local assessments, coupled with similar assessments across
the country,80 exhibit the blatant use of ethnic and demographic information as a primary
component of domestic security threat assessments by the FBI.
What is clear from the manner of these assessments is that investigations by the FBI are
no longer performed based on criminal predicates, but rather ethnic and demographic
characteristics of communities of color that have some stereotypical and unfounded social
association with particular types of crime. This predictive assessment very closely resembles
another scientific practice that presents a host of uncomfortable metaphorical conclusions:
“disease surveillance” by epidemiologists.81 Epidemiologists study diseases within a population
with the aim of curtailing their spread and eliminating their presence within that population.
Broad-based public surveillance efforts, like epidemiological studies, collect large quantities of
simple information on as many individuals within a community as possible to determine
behavioral patterns that may lead to the discovery of the “disease path,” or the transmission of the
pathogen to be eliminated—or in the case of public surveillance: potential terrorist threats.82
Although dangers to personal privacy could be ameliorated by anonymizing the information
gathered, the very presence of such “personal vectors” within the information available to an
agency exposes individuals to severe threats to personal liberty should those gathering the
information ever cease to self-monitor. Intelligence agencies are demonstrably vulnerable to this
flaw, if past practice is any indicator. The FBI engages in these types of assessments under the
name “domain management.”83 The goal of domain management is to acquire an understanding of
the threats and vulnerabilities within a territory. Tellingly, such threats were sometimes initially
assessed through analysis based partly on the hope that “sales records of Middle Eastern food
would lead to Iranian terrorists.”84
The U.S. domestic security apparatus, as part of the war-on-terror paradigm, seems to be
stuck in a wartime footing that demands dramatic, extensive surveillance as part of the guarantee
of American security.85 As is apparent from the FBI and NYPD investigations revealing the

79
2010 FOIA, Documents ACLURM011388 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011388.pdf.
80

ACLU Eye on the FBI: The FBI Is Engaged in Unconstitutional Racial Profiling and Racial “Mapping,”
ACLU (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_alert_-_fbi_engaged
_in_unconstitutional_racial_profiling_and_racial_mapping_0.pdf (“Without any evidence of actual wrongdoing and based
on a generalized and entirely unsubstantiated threat assertion, the Detroit FBI sought to collect information about MiddleEastern and Muslim communities in Michigan.”). In addition, Russian and Chinese populations in San Francisco were
similarly targeted because they were of significant size and there has “been organized crime [within this community] for
generations.” Id. Furthermore, the investigations into MS-13 in Georgia were duplicated in at least Alabama and New
Jersey. Id.
81

Rascoff, supra note 51, at 605-13.

82

See id. at 610-11.

83

See FBI, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE, at 15-3 (2011), available at
https://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%20%28DIOG%29/fbidomestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-2011-version/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diogoctober-15-2011-part-01-of-03/view.
84
Jeff Stein, FBI Hoped to Follow Falafel Trail to Iranian Terrorists Here, CONG. Q. HOMELAND SEC.,
Nov. 2, 2007, available at Westlaw 2007 WLNR 21995390.
85

Victor Bascara, Cultural Politics of Redress: Reassessing the Meaning of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988
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targeting of ethnic, national, and religious communities, there have been significant recent trends
in investigation correlating criminality with certain ethnic characteristics. Profiling has occurred
not merely because a racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristic has been used to identify a
target for surveillance, but rather because those characteristics have been used as substitutes for
individualized investigation into, or particularized information about, the potential for criminality
within a particular group or of individual persons. Thus, race is being used as a signal of
criminality, not a descriptor of an individual.86
Discrimination and discriminatory legal wrangling is no stranger to the American scene.
From the expulsion of Native American tribes in violation of treaty obligations, to the three-fifths
clause of our Constitution, to internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, the U.S.
government has taken sweeping actions to “secure” this country for its nominally (and
inconsistently) “white”87 citizenry to the detriment of people of color and immigrants. Modern
expressions of these tactics have manifested in discriminatory enforcement against, and searches
of, populations of people of color and immigrants (in spite of the fact that actual drug possession
rates do not significantly differ between races88 and rates of usage for some drugs are twice as
high for Caucasians as they are for non-Caucasian populations89), disproportionate arrest90 and
imprisonment of people of color and immigrants,91 and now the targeting of ethnic and religious
minority populations for surveillance and control.
Discrimination is also part of law enforcement outside of the security realm, particularly
in the field of immigration. People from certain nations have been targeted for intensified
identification measures, “voluntary” interviewing, discriminatory deportation, and baseless
detention.92 During the ambit of the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System, immigrants
from Muslim and Arab countries experienced an increase in deportation that was nearly ten times

after 9/11, 10 ASIAN L.J. 185, 185-86 (2003) (noting the hysteria that surrounded the treatment of Americans—both
citizens and immigrants—who shared the nationality of a country with which the United States was at war and their
treatment, including years of internment, deprivation of property and disruption of lives in every way possible, in the
pursuit of American security).
86
Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan, Defining Racial Profiling in a PostSeptember 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1210-17 (2003).
87

See Sam Roberts, A Nation of None and All of the Above, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 16, 2008),
nytimes.com/2008/08/17/weekinreview/17roberts.html?_r=0 (discussing how the definition of “white” in America has
been adapted through time).
88

Ramirez, Hoopes & Quinlan, supra note 86, at 1211-12.

89

See List of Available Quick Tables for the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2011, SUBSTANCE
ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/quicktables/quickconfig.do?34481-0001_all
(providing links to create tables based on drug use and respondent characteristics of users, including race and ethnicity).
90

Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257,
271-72 (2009) (noting that in the United States, blacks were arrested at 3.5 to 3.9 times the rate of whites in recent years,
and at five times the rate of whites from 1988 to 1993).
91

HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES
2 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf (finding that black males are incarcerated at six
times the rate of white males).
92

See B.J. Smith, Emma Lazarus Weeps: State-Based Anti-Immigration Initiatives and the Federalism
Challenge, 80 UMKC L. REV. 905, 915 (2012).
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the average increase for immigrants from other countries.93 Laws that permit law enforcement
officers to detain suspected undocumented residents on a “reasonable suspicion” allow for
extended detention of members of the public not accused of criminal activity.94 “Show-me-yourpapers” laws that require documentation of immigration status impose significant burdens on
many immigrants and interfere with national uniformity of immigration systems.95 Some states
have even enacted laws that allow police officers to arrest an individual on “the probable belief
that a person has committed a public offense that makes him or her removable from the United
States.”96 Removability determinations require due process, and are difficult for many
experienced decision makers to handle, let alone untrained police officers without the necessary
legal knowledge. Such statutory provisions serve as little more than a pretext to profile and harass
immigrants and people of color.
IV. FBI GUIDELINES
Attorney General Edward Levi first devised an internal protocol97 (known as the “Levi
Guidelines”) for FBI domestic security investigations in 1976 in response to public criticism.98
Allison Jones articulates the reasons for the criticism:
Attorney General Levi created the FBI guidelines to protect the liberties of U.S.
citizens from the internal, domestic threats of President Nixon’s abuses of
power. The executive power, extended to the Attorney General and the FBI by
law, allowed President Nixon’s and previous administrations to conduct at-will
and without predicate the kinds of investigations typically applied to suspects of
criminal activity for the purpose of indictment. The FBI did not implement a
formal court process, nor was there any set of rules governing the FBI’s
requirement to establish probable cause before commencing an investigation.
Under these practices, the abuses later uncovered by Attorney General Levi and
the investigatory committees appointed by Congress included: secret
surveillance of individuals opposing the Vietnam War; more than 500,000 files
on domestic groups and U.S. citizens of all religions, beliefs, and political
affiliations; and most infamously, the compilation of intelligence information
and the surveillance of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) and civil rights activists like Martin Luther King, Jr.,

93

Id.

94

Id. at 923.

95

See id. at 924-25.

96

Id. at 933-34.

97

Letter from Edward H. Levi, Attorney General, to FBI Director Clarence M. Kelly (Nov. 4, 1976),
reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., pt. 1, 18, 20-26 (1978)
[hereinafter Levi Guidelines].
98

Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 41, 58 (2011).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss4/1

INDISCRIMINATE POWER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

7/24/15 1:34 PM

INDISCRIMINATE POWER: RACIAL PROFILING AND SURVEILLANCE SINCE 9/11

297

whom the FBI targeted because he might “abandon his supposed ‘obedience to
white liberal doctrines.”‘99
The Levi Guidelines called for a factual basis for initiating investigations and for
additional requirements if the investigation progressed further.100 Under the Levi Guidelines,
agents of the Bureau could launch preliminary investigations only if they possessed information
that indicated activities which could be violent or “which involve or will involve the violation of
federal law.”101 Preliminary investigations could last only ninety days.102 If the allegations had no
factual basis, as determined by a limited review of public records and interviews, they were to be
dropped.103 Full investigations had to be predicated on “articulable facts giving reason to believe”
that a person or group was engaging in activities that violate federal law.104 Techniques such as
electronic surveillance, informant recruitment, appearances at demonstrations or meetings,105 and
“mail covers”106 could only be used during full investigations.107
Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey issued a revised version of the guidelines in
2008.108 The revisions, which represented the “weakest version” ever issued by an Attorney
General, afforded the FBI unprecedented discretion.109 The Mukasey Guidelines continued the
trajectory that began after 9/11: “[p]urported ‘national security’ initiatives continue to trump the
individual rights of U.S. citizens.”110 The Mukasey Guidelines afford FBI agents discretion to
conduct interviews that extend far beyond those allowed under the Levi Guidelines.111 The
Mukasey guidelines opened the door to “a standard that could conceivably justify interviews
initiated to inquire into the religious or political”112 motivations whenever “the circumstances
99

Jones, supra note 1.

100

Levi Guidelines, supra note 97, at 21-22.

101

Id. at 20-21.

102

Id. at 22.

103

See id. at 60-61.

104

Id. at 22.

105

The FBI agents’ attendance of public meetings has a chilling effect on free speech. See generally Gayle
Horn, Online Searches and Offline Challenges: The Chilling Effect, Anonymity and the New FBI Guidelines, 60 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 735 (2005) (evaluating the chilling effect from new internet provisions in the FBI Guidelines on
General Crimes).
106
Through the mail covers system, law enforcement requests that the United States Postal Service record
information from the outside of letters and parcels before delivery and send the information to the requesting agency. Ron
Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html.
107

Jones, supra note 1, at 142.

108

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter MUKASEY
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2008/10/03/guidelines.pdf.
109

Sinnar, supra note 98, at 58.

110

Jones, supra note 1, at 165.

111

See Sinnar, supra note 98, at 59.

112

Id.
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warrant.”113 Moreover, the Mukasey Guidelines do nothing to mitigate potential First Amendment
violations.114
Former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. has released his revisions to the
guidelines.115 The proposed guidelines expand prohibited profiling to include “religion, national
origin, gender and sexual orientation.”116 These prohibited categories would be functionally
equivalent to the prohibition on racial profiling. The guidelines raise the standard that agents are
required to meet before considering these factors: “unless there is specific, credible information
that makes race relevant to a case,” it must be ignored.117 According to Hina Shamsi, an attorney
with the ACLU, “Putting an end to [religious profiling] not only comports with the Constitution,
it would put real teeth to the F.B.I.’s claims that it wants better relationships with religious
minorities.”118
The revised guidelines do however, allow the FBI to map ethnic populations and use that
information “to recruit informants and open investigations.”119 Furthermore, the guidelines do
“not apply to interdiction activities in the vicinity of the border,”120 and thus provide tacit
approval to the FBI, the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), and Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) to engage in profiling within the “vicinity” of the border. The
“vicinity” of the border is understood to reach 100 miles from any external land or sea boundary,
as well as airports and seaports that are located on inland waterways.121 The guidelines further do
not cover state and local enforcement. While the guidelines cover some joint federal and local law
enforcement activities,122 a nationwide ban on unconstitutional practices is sorely needed.

113

See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 108, at 16 (2008).

114

Sinnar, supra note 98, at 59.

115

Matt Apuzzo, Profiling Rules Said to Give F.B.I. Tactical Leeway, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/us/profiling-rules-said-to-give-fbi-tactical-leeway.html. See also Sari Horwitz,
Justice Dept. Announces New Rules to Curb Racial Profiling by Federal Law Enforcement, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-to-announce-new-rules-to-curb-racial-profiling-byfederal-law-enforcement/2014/12/07/e00eca18-7e79-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html.
116

Apuzzo, supra note 115.

117

Matt Apuzzo, U.S. to Expand Rules Limiting Use of Profiling by Federal Agents (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/us/politics/us-to-expand-rules-limiting-use-of-profiling-by-federal-agents.html. See
also Sinnar, supra note 98, at 59.
118

Apuzzo, supra note 117.

119

Apuzzo, supra note 115. See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR
GENDER IDENTITY 8
(2014) [hereinafter 2014 GUIDANCE], available
at http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/ag/pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-race-policy.pdf.
120

2014 GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 2 n.2.

121

See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(b) (2015). See also Customs and Border Protection’s
(CBP’s) 100-Mile Rule, ACLU, http://legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/CBP%20100%20Mile%20Rule.pdf (last
visited June 29, 2015).
122

2014 GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 1.
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V. IMPACT OF PROFILING ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Racial profiling is the targeting of individuals based on individuals’ “race, ethnicity,
religion or national origin.”123 Racial profiling in the United States continues to occur, such as
stopping people of color for minor traffic violations (often referred to as “driving while black or
brown”).124 In New York City, the police department’s “stop and frisk” practices provide another
current example of racial profiling.125
These examples reflect the continued tension between police power and the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.126 The Fourth Amendment “guarantees all people
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and specifies that probable cause
must exist before the issuance of a warrant.”127 If the facts and circumstances before the officer
are sufficient “to warrant a man of reasonable caution in . . . belie[ving] that an offense has
been . . . committed,’ there is probable cause.”128 Probable cause “indicates that a crime likely has
occurred rather than might have occurred.”129 Law enforcement must “possess fact-based
particularized suspicion before they search or seize a person or property.”130 The search or seizure
is often carried “through an official warrant, describing the place to be searched or the thing to be
seized.”131 At a minimum, however, officers cannot stop someone without some facts that justify
them in doing so.132
Police investigatory stops of both pedestrians and motorists—commonly known as Terry
stops—must be based on specific, individualized, and articulable facts indicating that criminal or
illegal activity might be taking place.133 “This suspicion must be based on specific facts known to
the officer, in light of the totality of the circumstances, and cannot stem from a mere hunch or
subjective bias . . . .”134 If reasonable suspicion exists, an officer can perform a Terry stop, ask the
123
ACLU, Racial Profiling: Definition, http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/racial-profiling-definition/ (last
visited June 29, 2015).
124

Id.

125

See ELIOT SPITZER, CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP &
FRISK” PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL (1999), available at http://purl.org/net/nysl/nysdocs/43037966.
126

See Azadeh Shahshahani, Immigration and Racial Profiling, in CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 477, 478-79 (Linda Friedman Ramirez ed., 3d ed. 2010).
127

Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

128

Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479.
129
Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479; ACLU, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL PROFILING IN GWINETT:
TIME FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND AN END TO 287(G), at 18 (Azadeh Shahshahani ed., 2010), available at
http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/1504/392/ (citing Safford, 129 U.S. at 2639).
130

Morgan Cloud, Quakers, Slaves and the Founders: Profiling to Save the Union, 73 MISS. L.J. 369, 369

131

Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)).

132

Id.; ACLU, supra note 129.

133

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

134

Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479; ACLU, supra note 129; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.

(2003).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

INDISCRIMINATE POWER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

300

7/24/15 1:34 PM

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 18.4

individual to identify him or herself, and ask what he or she is doing.135 A Terry stop is different
than a full police encounter and, from a constitutional perspective, requires no probable cause
because the scope of the police’s potential intrusion is curtailed.136 “[W]ith probable cause, the
officer can seize and arrest the individual. . . . [and] if after the stop[] there is no information
leading to probable cause, the officer must let the [individual] go.”137
“It is clear from these constitutional standards that an officer must possess at least some
information indicating criminal or illegal activity in order to stop an individual, and even more
information[—‘probable cause’—]to make an arrest.”138 While the definitional standard is fuzzy,
probable cause is less than a “preponderance of the evidence,” which requires at least half of the
evidence plus one to be found in favor of the moving party, but more than “reasonable suspicion,”
which is required to justify a temporary investigative detention.
As Azadeh Shahshahani—one of the authors of this Article—has maintained, these
standards illustrate “exactly why racial profiling is problematic from a legal standpoint.”139
Because “[n]o logical relationship exists between [racial] characteristics and the commission of
crimes,”140 without other information, officers who conduct stops or make arrests based solely on
an individual’s race or ethnicity do not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion.141
Profiling based on certain forms of expression can chill free speech rights when it
effectively becomes a proxy for racial or religious profiling:
The harms associated with First Amendment profiling mirror those arising from
explicit racial or religious profiling. Where a form of expression is strongly
linked to one’s ethnicity, national origin, or religion, government selection of
individuals for special scrutiny on account of their expression will “feel” the
same as targeting members of that racial or religious group directly.142
Professor Frank Cooper argues that identity—and thus, to a degree, one’s personality—is
composed of both an internal and an external component.143 Since what you do is the only
representative aspect of who you are, and your identity is to some extent constrained by what it is
that you can do, social limitations on your ability to act or speak in certain ways constrain the
parameters within which you can construct your identity.144 Put differently, if you feel as though
you cannot act, speak, or associate for fear of surveillance or prosecution, you will avoid those
means of self-expression and—due to the social pressure constructing that constraint—your
personality will actually be altered. Fear of surveillance creates changes in behavioral patterns
135

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

136

Id.; Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26.

137

Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 479 (footnote omitted); ACLU, supra note 129.

138

Id.

139

Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 480.

140

Cloud, supra note 130, at 370.

141

Shahshahani, supra note 126, at 480; ACLU, supra note 129, at 18-19.

142

Sinnar, supra note 98, at 65 (footnote omitted).

143

Cooper, supra note 24, at 536-38.

144

Id.
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that force conformity with status quo personal and political identities.145
VI. COURT CHALLENGES
Some court rulings have curbed the government’s unbridled surveillance. In two class
action cases in particular, plaintiffs had claimed that the City of Chicago’s police department and
the FBI had conducted surveillance of plaintiffs’ lawful activities and had gathered the
information by unlawful means.146 Unified in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, the
decision evaluated whether the settlement reached by the two actions was equitable.147 The
resulting consent decrees erected strict limitations on how police could conduct surveillance of
political activity.148 The decrees stipulated that the City of Chicago would not conduct
investigations solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment and would only
target conduct forbidden by criminal law.149 Decided in 1982 by Judge Getzendanner, the district
court held that the two parties’ submission of proposed settlement agreements to the court
provided plaintiffs with injunctive relief and was “fair, reasonable, and appropriate.”150
In 1986, in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, the
Socialist Workers Party alleged wrongdoing by the FBI, including electronic surveillance after the
Attorney General classified the party as a subversive organization according to Section V.2.f of
Executive Order 9835.151 The court found these activities to be violations of the Socialist Workers
Party’s constitutional rights.152 The court went further and awarded the Socialist Workers Party
$42,500 for disruptive activities by the FBI, $96,500 for surreptitious entries, and $125,000 for
the FBI’s use of informants, for a complete recovery of $264,000.153
Decided in 2003, Handschu v. Special Services Division154 was the culmination of a
prolonged legal challenge to the maintenance of dossiers on political activists and the use of
various undercover and surveillance techniques to monitor the activities of political organizations
and individuals in New York City.155 A consent decree was entered into in 1985.156 Among its
145

Id.

146

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 539-40 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (filed as
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, No. 74 C 3268 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1974), and ACLU v. City of Chicago,
No. 75 C 3295 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 1975)).
147

See generally id.

148

See id. at 560-71.

149

Id. at 562-64.

150

Id. at 555.

151

Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1363, 1396. (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Executive Order 9835 established the Employee Loyalty Program for civilian employees in the executive branch. Id. at
1396.
152

Id. at 1364.

153

Id. at 1432.

154

Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

155

See Handschu v. Special Services Division (Challenging NYPD Surveillance Practices Targeting
Political
Groups),
NYCLU,
http://www.nyclu.org/case/handschu-v-special-services-division-challenging-nypdsurveillance-practices-targeting-politica (last visited June 29, 2015).
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stipulations was a requirement that the NYPD would be prevented from investigating
organizations unless there was “specific information” that the organization was intending to
commit a crime or that it had committed a crime.157 Most prominently, the decree also established
a system of recordkeeping and procedures for approval of investigations by a three-member body,
called the Handschu Authority.158
Despite these judicial constraints, other cases have allowed government surveillance to
continue or expand. In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, led by
Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards, held that federal agencies, including the FBI, could withhold
certain investigatory information—including how suspects are surveilled—even though the
methods used by the FBI may have been improper, as long as the information was created in the
pursuit of a law enforcement purpose.159 As a result, the court did not distinguish the FBI’s
documents on its program against “black nationalist groups,” which listed the goals of
“prevent[ing] militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by
discrediting them,” from other documents with law enforcement purpose.160
In 1986, in López-Pacheco v. United States, the plaintiff claimed that he was injured as a
result of FBI surveillance activity.161 The court dismissed the case, holding that the FBI’s
activities were of the nature and quality that Congress had shielded from tort liability in the
“discretionary function” exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act.162
Other court challenges are currently pending. In 2013, the ACLU filed a complaint
against the NYPD on behalf of Hamid Hassan Raza and several members of New York’s Muslim
community.163 The Raza complaint accused the NYPD of “engag[ing] in an unlawful policy and
practice of religious profiling and suspicionless surveillance of Muslim New Yorkers” since
2002.164 The complaint maintained that the policy, in theory and practice, targeted Muslims with
the justification that their “religious belief and practices are a basis for law enforcement
scrutiny.”165 For example, in the 2007 NYPD Intelligence Division report titled Radicalization in
the West: The Homegrown Threat, the NYPD identified a discrete “radicalization process” where
certain, constitutionally protected expressions of religious belief, such as “wearing traditional
Islamic clothing” and “becoming involved in social activism,” are justifying factors in
surveillance.166 In a similar action, Hassan v. City of New York,167 a group of Muslims from New
156

Id. at 331.

157

Id. at 331-32.

158

Id.; Handschu v. Special Services Division (Challenging NYPD Surveillance Practices Targeting
Political Groups), supra note 155.
159

Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 423-25 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

160

Id. at 422.

161

López-Pacheco v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1224, 1225 (D.P.R. 1986).

162

Id. at 1229-31.

163

Complaint, Raza v. City of New York, No. 1:13-CV-03448 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013), available at
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/raza-v-city-new-york-complaint.
164

Id. at 1.

165

Id.

166

MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, INTELLIGENCE DIV., NYPD, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST:
THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 21, 33 (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/
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Jersey represented by Muslim Advocates and the Center for Constitutional Rights challenged the
NYPD’s discriminatory spying program targeting American Muslims. In February 2014, Judge
William J. Martini ruled that if the plaintiffs were harmed by the NYPD surveillance, it was a
result of the reporting by the Associated Press rather than as a consequence of the secret
practice.168 The decision was appealed following the district court’s dismissal.169
In sum, these cases have established most investigatory practices as beyond practical
restraint; even where they remain illegal, they are made legally invisible and thus uncontrollable
by the courts.
As former ACLU national staff counsel and CEO of the JFK Library Foundation John
H.F. Shattuck has noted, “[p]olitical surveillance . . . has a long and troubled history in the United
States.”170 This history is not about to get any brighter. For instance, instead of discussing
modification with class counsel, the NYPD moved for an order modifying the Handschu
Guidelines under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to significantly relax the restrictions
placed on the NYPD.171 Judge Charles Sherman Haight, Jr. granted many of the NYPD’s
requested modifications.172 Judge Haight found significant factual changes since the Guidelines
were enacted, noting that “[t]here is no disputing Deputy Commissioner Cohen’s assertion that
since the formulation of the Handschu Guidelines in 1985, ‘[t]he world has undergone remarkable
changes[] . . . in terms of new threats we face.’”173 That the longstanding Handschu lawsuit
continues to this day, forty-four years after its inception, is sobering.174
Such “remarkable changes” will also be the calling card of surveillance that views civil

NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.
167
Hassan v. City of New York, No. 2:12-3401, 2014 WL 654604 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014), appeal filed, No.
14-1688 (3d Cir. Mar. 24, 2014).
168

Hassan v. City of New York, No. 2:12-3401, 2014 WL 654604, *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014).

169

See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, Hassan v. City of New York, No. 14-1688-cv, (3d Cir. Jul. 3, 2014),
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/7-3-14%20Plaintiffs'%20Appeal%20Brief%20-%20Hassan.pdf.
170

John H.F. Shattuck, Tilting at the Surveillance Apparatus, 1 C.L. REV. 59, 59 (1974).

171

See Handschu, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 329. The resulting order granted alterations from the Guidelines of the
1985 Handschu Decree in the following respect: under the 1985 Decree, an investigation must have met the substantive
threshold of “specific information” that a crime had been or was about to be committed. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div.,
605 F. Supp. 1384, 1421 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Under the modified Handschu Guidelines, which incorporated the FBI
Guidelines, a preliminary inquiry can be initiated when there is “information . . . which indicates the possibility of criminal
activity.” Handschu, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES,
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/fbi/generalcrimes2.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 108, at
18.
172

Handschu, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 349.

173

Id. at 337 (quoting Declaration of David Cohen, at ¶ 7 (Sept. 12, 2002)) (second alteration in original).

174

See, e.g., Handschu v. Special Services Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203(CSH), 2014 WL 407103 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
30, 2014) (noting unsettled disputes between the parties); Handschu v. Police Dep’t of City of New York, 905 F. Supp. 2d
555 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (attempting to resolve dispute over a previous court order); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 475 F.
Supp. 2d 331, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“There will be a Handschu class action and a judge of this Court in charge of it for it
as long as New York City stands . . . .”), vacated, No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2007 WL 1711775, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007)
(noting the case arose from an action filed in 1971).
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liberties as obstacles to be overcome rather than respected. There is no doubt that police
surveillance of constitutionally protected First Amendment activity will continue into the
foreseeable future. The scope of the substantive changes to the Handschu Guidelines is still being
litigated, though this battle is a mere microcosm of the larger struggle being waged to define the
parameters of constitutional protection. It will likely be years before we can adequately assess the
effect of the favorable legal decisions above on civil liberties in an era defined by September 11,
2001. Yet we can safely acknowledge that, despite these successes, recent trends show increased
pressure to curtail civil liberties under the aegis of counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence.
VII. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The war on terror has served as pretext for increasing surveillance on American citizens,
based on racial, ethnic, religious, or other status grounds. Racial, ethnic, religious, and political
profiling is not only counter to U.S. law and internal Department of Justice directives, but it also
contravenes principles of international law.
The United Nations provides extensive recommendations and guidelines on privacy and
racial discrimination.175 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) is one such
document that establishes a basis for understanding the right to privacy.176 UDHR Article 12
states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence. . . .”177 The rights in the UDHR are to be protected and provided for all persons
regardless of race, religion, political association, or other similar status.178 Although Article 17.1
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) reads similar to UDHR
Article 12,179 ICCPR Article 4 provides some clarification regarding derogation of rights, stating
that, in times of emergency, states “may take measures derogating from their obligations” insofar
as such measures are consistent with other obligations and “do not involve discrimination solely
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.”180 The difficulty in the

175
Non-governmental organizations also provide guidance. See generally Open Soc’y Justice Initiative et
al., The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (Tshwane Principles), ACLU (2013),
https://www.aclu.org/human-rights/global-principles-national-security-and-right-information-tshwane-principles
[hereinafter Global Principles on National Security].
176

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948). The UDHR was drafted as a result of the experience of the Second World War and served to complement the UN
Charter with a way to guarantee the rights of individuals. It is considered a foundational document for international human
rights law.
177

Id. art. 12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.”).
178

Id. art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.”).
179

See id. art. 12; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, opened for signature Dec.
19. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”),
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/v999.pdf.
180

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 179, art. 4, at 174.
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United States is that government officials continually subvert international obligations due to
perceived “national security” prerogatives on constitutionally dubious, if nominally legal,
grounds.181 The new FBI guidelines will still allow these subversions as they do not apply to all
government agencies, including but not limited to the TSA and the CBP.182 Even in times of war,
however, status discrimination is always outside of a government’s permitted tool set.
Aside from violating the rights to privacy, current monitoring practices are founded on
the profiling of potential suspects based on racial, ethnic, religious, and other status grounds. The
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) sets clear
guidelines and recommendations regarding state actions and policies that may rely on racial
distinctions.183 The CERD defines “racial discrimination” as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural or any other field of public life.184
As parties to this treaty, states agree to the definitions therein, and also agree to review
governmental policies, and to amend or rescind those that perpetuate racial discrimination.185
Despite this requirement, the United States has expanded surveillance and intelligence powers and
authorizations clearly targeting people based on racial, ethnic, religious, or other status grounds.
VIII. PRIVACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the right to privacy is not as absolute as freedom from status discrimination,
limitations on privacy are only justified in accord with the provisions and objectives of the
ICCPR. In Toonen v. Australia, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the body that
monitors the implementation of the ICCPR, explained that it “interprets the requirement of
reasonableness [in ICCPR article 17] to imply that any interference with privacy must be

181

International treaties are not self-executing in the United States; they must be approved by Congress and
ratified by the President to be executed into law. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS:
THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 2-3 (2015), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf. In addition, via
ratification, countries have the opportunity to place reservations or understandings on the treaties, which can alter the
extent of obligations. Id. at 3. This means that quite often, treaties can be manipulated so that they are effectively null,
even post ratification. See id.
182

ACLU Response to Revised DOJ Guidance on the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies,
ACLU (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform-racial-justice/aclu-response-revised-doj-guidance-userace-federal-law-enforceme.
183

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212.
184

Id. art. 1, at 216.

185

Id. art. 2, at 218 (“Each State Party shall take effective measures to review governmental, national and
local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating
racial discrimination wherever it exists; . . . .”).
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proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.”186 In the
case of surveillance, one would need to determine whether perpetual monitoring is necessary and
proportionate to the end sought. The end in this case is threat assessment and, should a threat be
discovered, attempts at prevention. In the case of perpetual monitoring, the scope is shockingly
broad.187 These means are simply not necessary or proportional to achieve the desired outcome.
Outside of treaties, the international community has crafted a significant number of
guidelines regarding privacy and surveillance. More specifically, the United Nations has taken a
leading role in defining the right to privacy in the digital age, particularly given the special
vulnerabilities of electronic communications and digital identities.188 The discussion surrounding
the right to privacy in the digital age began with a resolution in which the United Nations General
Assembly expressed concern about the impact that surveillance has on human rights and affirmed
that rights must be protected in online formats just as in real life.189 The General Assembly also
called upon states to:
review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the surveillance of
communications, their interception and the collection of personal data,
including mass surveillance, interception and collection, with a view to

186

Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol 133, 139, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/5, (2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/SDecisionsVol5en.pdf (“[T]he
Committee recalls that pursuant to its general comment 16 (32) on article 17, the ‘introduction of the concept of
arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by the law should be in accordance with the
provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the circumstances[.’] The
Committee interprets the requirement of reasonableness to imply that any interference with privacy must be proportional
to the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.”). See also Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 16, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/REV.9 (Vol. I) (Apr. 8, 1988), available at http://ccprcentre.org/
doc/ICCPR/General%20Comments/HRI.GEN.1.Rev.9(Vol.I)_(GC16)_en.pdf.
187
Letter from ACLU to Eric H. Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen. 3 (Oct. 20, 2011), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_letter_to_ag_re_rm_102011_0.pdf (“A 2009 FBI Counterterrorism Division
‘Baseline Collection Plan’ obtained by the ACLU through FOIA reveals the broad scope of information the FBI gathers
during Assessments and retains in its systems: identifying information (date of birth, social security number, driver’s
license and passport number, etc.), telephone and e-mail addresses, current and previous addresses, current employer and
job title, recent travel history, whether the person lives with other adults, possesses special licenses or permits or has
received specialized training, and whether the person has purchased firearms or explosives.”). Information collected by the
FBI Counterterrorism Division may or may not be related to criminal activity. Id.
188
See The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx (last visited June 29, 2015) (“But at the same
time it has become clear that these new technologies are vulnerable to electronic surveillance and interception. Recent
discoveries have revealed how new technologies are being developed covertly, often to facilitate these practices, with
chilling efficiency. . . . [S]uch surveillance threatens individual rights—including to privacy and to freedom of expression
and association—and inhibits the free functioning of a vibrant civil society.”) [hereinafter United Nations]; see generally
Global Principles on National Security, supra note 175.
189

The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, G.A. Res. 68/167, U.N. Doc A/RES/68/167 (Dec.18, 2013),
available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/167; United Nations, supra note 188.
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upholding the right to privacy by ensuring the full and effective implementation
of all their obligations under international human rights law . . . .190
Additionally, the resolution called upon the High Commissioner for Human Rights to
prepare a report examining the right to privacy in the digital age.191 The report, issued in June
2014, specifically cites concerns that the U.S. National Security Agency and United Kingdom
General Communications Headquarters have, together, created technologies that grant access to a
vast amount of global Internet traffic.192 Furthermore, the report indicates that a significant
number of human rights other than the right to privacy have been impacted by digital surveillance
practices including, but not limited to, freedom of opinion and expression, family life, and the
right to health by the implementation of practices as diverse as torture and drone warfare.193
Member states and other stakeholders have expressed concerns with unfettered access to Internet
traffic and requested that guidelines be set to ensure security and privacy within reason for all
peoples.194
IX. THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERSECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
NATIONAL POLICY, AND SOCIAL CONVENTION
Although the United States prides itself on being a (self-appointed) beacon of human
rights protection for the international community, its adherence to international human rights

190

G.A. Res. 68/167, supra note 189, at ¶ 4(c).

191

Id. at ¶ 5.

192

U.N. Human Rights Council Rep. of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the
Digital Age ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014), available at ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf (“These technologies have reportedly been deployed
through a transnational network comprising strategic intelligence relationships between Governments, regulatory control
of private companies and commercial contracts.”).
193
Id. at ¶ 14. In addition, the report also indicates that digital surveillance leads to concerns with
compliance with international humanitarian law. Id. (“There are credible indications to suggest that digital technologies
have been used to gather information that has then led to torture and other ill-treatment. Reports also indicate that
metadata derived from electronic surveillance have been analysed to identify the location of targets for lethal drone strikes.
Such strikes continue to raise grave concerns over compliance with international human rights law and humanitarian law,
and accountability for any violations thereof. The linkages between mass surveillance and these other effects on human
rights, while beyond the scope of the present report, merit further consideration.”) The rights referred to in the report
include rights as listed in the UDHR, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 176, in addition to the ICCPR
(which the United States has ratified), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 179, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (to which the United States is a signatory). International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signing Dec. 19, 1966, 933 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20993/v993.pdf.
194

The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, supra note 189. Following on the concerns of member states
and other stakeholders at the negative impact of surveillance practices on human rights, in December 2013 the General
Assembly adopted resolution 68/167, without a vote, on the right to privacy in the digital age. Id. In the resolution, which
was co-sponsored by fifty-seven member states, the Assembly affirmed that the rights held by people offline must also be
protected online, and called upon all states to respect and protect the right to privacy in digital communication. Id.; see
also U.N. Gen. Assembly, Rep. of the Third Comm., 23-25, U.N. Doc. A/68/456/Add.2 (Dec. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/456/Add.2.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

INDISCRIMINATE POWER - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

308

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

7/24/15 1:34 PM

[Vol. 18.4

standards leaves much to be desired. The United States voted in favor of the UDHR and has
ratified the ICCPR and the CERD, but has placed reservations and understandings on these
instruments to ensure that it has room to maneuver around rights protection as necessary, a
strategy that is allowable under international law.195 The United States uses public safety and
national security to undermine the effect of provisions pertaining to discrimination, clarifying that
the United States guarantees protection for all peoples under the law, yet, in times of emergency,
the United States reserves the right to implement distinctions “that may have a disproportionate
effect upon persons of a particular status.”196 Additionally, a U.S. reservation to the CERD denies
that the convention can authorize action by the United States that is incompatible with the U.S.
Constitution, and ensures that the United States has the power to determine its degree of
adherence to conventions by means of domestic precedent based solely on domestic law.197
The war on terror has caused a shift in the way the U.S. government and American
society view war and wartime tactics. This shift to a mindset of constant war has made that which
was once exceptional into the status quo, in addition to adjusting the social conceptions that
traditionally drew distinct boundaries between war and peace and ratcheting up the level of
subversion of rights that is commonly acceptable to the public during times of “war.” The former
General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, Jeh Johnson, stated in a speech at Oxford
University in 2012 that “‘[w]ar’ must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural state of
affairs.”198 The war on terror, with its unknowable opponent, unattainable objectives, and
consequently indeterminate duration, shatters that traditional conception and, with it, the
associated norms of governmental behavior and public expectations.
195

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, opened for signature May 23,

1969.
196

Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Volume 1, Chapter IV, 4. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—Declarations and Reservations, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION 13,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (“That the Constitution and laws
of the United States guarantee all persons equal protection of the law and provide extensive protections against
discrimination. The United States understands distinctions based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, pro[p]erty, birth or any other status—as those terms are used in article 2, paragraph
1 and article 26—to be permitted when such distinctions are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective. The United States further understands the prohibition in paragraph 1 of article 4 upon discrimination, in time of
public emergency, based ‘solely’ on the status of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin, not to bar
distinctions that may have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status.”). See also Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary-General, Volume 1, Chapter IV, 2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination—Declarations and Reservations, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION 9, https://treaties.un.org/
doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-2.en.pdf.
197
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Volume 1, Chapter IV, 2. International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination—Declarations and Reservations, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION 9 (“The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of individual rights, such as
the right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other
action by the United States of America incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of
America.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). By reserving the right to make distinctions based on race, ethnicity, etc.,
the United States has the ability to circumvent the requirements of the convention and determine and police its own
policies. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-20 (1957) (holding that the U.S. Constitution supersedes international law).
198
Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Def., Speech Given at Oxford University: The
Conflict Against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End? 10 (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/211954.pdf.
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The U.S. government has used the war on terror, to justify a number of rights restrictions
for U.S. citizens and individuals it has detained on an indefinite basis. This “war” of indefinite
duration has served as a justification for torture and the expansion of surveillance powers.
Although the derogation of certain rights is allowed during times of certain predefined security
crises, its continuation through a perpetual security crisis risks permanent rights infringements,
and even the ultimate destruction of rights. The increase in rights abuses and racial targeting on
American soil is but a single consequence of perpetual, normalized war.
X. CONCLUSION
The U.S. government has used a heavy hand to sort our nation by color, and continues to
do so. The cultural and political motives of control and maintenance of the status quo exhibited
during COINTELPRO are also part of the modern surveillance culture, albeit now more often
along religious lines and differently drawn ethnic lines. Although current surveillance and
intelligence efforts are intense, there have been recommendations, as early as 1970, that they be
intensified further.199 Suggestions ranged from opening physical mail to permitting surveillance of
any foreign national “of interest” in the United States, and from increasing group-characteristic
studies to ramping up CIA surveillance of American students and others living abroad:
(1) “coverage by NSA of the communications of U.S. citizens using
international facilities;”
(2) “intensification” of “electronic surveillances and penetrations” directed at
individuals and groups “who pose a major threat to the internal security” and at
“foreign nationals” in the United States “of interest to the intelligence
community;”
(3) removal of restrictions on “legal” mail coverage and relaxation of
“restrictions on covert coverage” [mail opening] on “selected targets of priority
foreign intelligence and internal security interest;”
(4) modification of “present restrictions” on “surreptitious entry” to allow
“procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material” and “to permit
selective use” against “high priority internal security targets;”
(5) relaxation of “present restrictions” on the “development of campus sources”
to permit “expanded coverage of violence-prone and student-related groups;[”]
(6) “increased” coverage by CIA “of American students (and others) traveling
or living abroad;”

199

SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV’T OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, book II, at 113 (2d Sess. 1976).
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(7) appointment of a “permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA,
DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies” to evaluate “domestic
intelligence” and to “carry out the other objectives specified in the report.”200
With more than forty years of evolution of technical capacities, executive power, and
group identity politics, it is possible that even more than this would be desired and carried out by
the government today.
What becomes apparent during even a brief recap of governmental profiling and biased
surveillance activities, coupled with a basic understanding of American history, is that attitudes
about race and other identities move freely back and forth between law enforcement and the
public. It is no coincidence that anti-Arab and anti-Muslim country sentiments following 9/11
paralleled government action against people of Arab and Muslim-country descent in immigration
and surveillance activities, nor that these types of discrimination have faced a lack of popular
outcry when limited to immigrant populations and persons of color.201 It would be naïve to think
the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II did not have roots in public sentiment
about the Japanese, fed in turn at least in part by biased portrayals on mass media. It is also true
that many major advances in the protection of civil rights have been fought every step along the
way by status quo political forces, and fed by discriminatory social attitudes, in a conflict that
ranges through social and political battlefields.202 What has been required to force advancement of
civil rights is effective governmental oversight and public information. Certain situations have
been easier to monitor—racially segregated schools are fairly obvious. Workplace rights, equal
access to public and private businesses, and the new push for equality for queer individuals have
been harder to monitor, but are still largely apparent in the public sphere. But the newer types of
discrimination and invasions of civil liberties seen here, worked in the relative secrecy of
immigration courtrooms, NSA bunkers, and secret, redactable FBI files, are tougher to ferret out.
Coupled with a lack of official oversight, it only stands to reason that this discrimination will
pervade an intelligence apparatus made up of the very same population that holds, in part, these
views.203
200
Id. White House staff assistant Tom Charles Huston made these recommendations, and also
recommended the use of covert mail opening even though it was “illegal, and there are serious risks involved,” and the use
of surreptitious entry even though it was “clearly illegal” and “amounts to burglary.” Id. at 113-14.
201
See Nida Khan, Why People Apparently Don’t Care About Muslim Surveillance or Dead Palestinian
Kids, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2014 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nida-khan/why-people-apparentlydon_b_5607744.html (discussing ties between broad public association of Muslims and Arab populations with terrorism
and extremism, and the way in which these populations are generally perceived to deserve the abuses perpetrated against
them that are considered more unwarranted when perpetrated against Caucasians or the U.S. population in general).
202

There is also evidence that the longer these surveillance apparatuses continue to exist, the more
compliant corporations will become with them. See Glenn Greenwald et al., Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to
Encrypted Messages, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsacollaboration-user-data. Extensive surveillance might also impact public perception of the acceptability of surveillance
systems, even if it doesn’t shift individual attitudes towards it, leading to a situation in which people believe, and publicly
proclaim, that increasing surveillance is acceptable, even though they might not personally be convinced of it vis-à-vis
their own selves. European Parliament Directorate Gen. Internal Policies, Union Policy Dep’t C, Citizens’ Rights and
Constitutional Affairs, A Review of the Increased Use of CCTV and Video-Surveillance for Crime Prevention Purposes in
Europe 9 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/apr/ep-study-norris-cctv-video-surveillance.pdf.
203
See generally Le Blanc, supra note 48 (showing that the type of people who populate the FBI has had
an appreciable impact on the manner in which the agency pursued its tasks).
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